Crackdown !

Brother Leader is a target

Mu’ammar al-Qathafi praying in his tent:

‘Basic People’s Congress Elvis Bucky free’:
Your prayers to the homeland in this Friday,

hoping to agree your case-hour response.

Mu praying in his tent




Zadek Gharyiani ousted from Tripoli

EXIT, the Antichrist Zadek al-Gharyiani (Cadb NATO Mufti of Misurata) from Tripoli:

‘MUSICIAN’ writes:


“Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphate are invented the role of the Mufti even convince people that the Caliph orders are orders to the same God.
He steals the religion of people steal them only enlightening lamp that walking on the light in a dark way.
He seems to have the audacity of lying.
Allah, how surprised them to lie on the cult.
Thus heavy, no matter what steps the feet of the slaves will not be able to reach the ears of freedom.”


Clashes in Qasr bin Ghashir between militias, criminal Salah al-Mirghani, and dirty Brotherhood Misurata militias.

And killed one of the Brotherhood Misurata militias, 

and close all roads.

The kidnapping and killing of the Comptroller of the education in Qsr bin Ghshir, and ‘chopping his body-up’, after he was implementation of the kidnappers’ demand and receive the amount of one and a half million dinars for Aba Mkabl‘s release !


‘Basic People’s Congress Elvis Bucky free’, comments:

What last night happened inside ‘corner Hospital’ after the arrival of the case of a person with a bullet to the emergency department and died upon arrival

but the strange thing is that there is an armed group chasing him even inside the hospital

and the doctors are converting a section of  intensive-care, in-order he could be washed; but the surprise was able Hola people of being able of reaching at Intensive-Care, in their belief that he was alive ! Thus was launched a hail of bullets from inside the newly incorporated intensive-care wing.  This man was deceased since entering the hospital.



Hit the Friday Market now




Haitham Ali Tagouris, attacks one of Misurata Brigades which led to the killing of al-Ghazali, one of the employees of ‘Antiquities battalion’ in Spring Valley.

Rat Militias in Spring Valley, TRIPOLI

Hathim Tagouris


Exposure offender Haitham Tagouris to a traffic accident last night, in
Shat, Tripoli. presently, he is in the way of health, and placed as currently stable and out of danger; BUT two of his bodyguards were wounded in the car, one seriously, who is called ‘Ibrahim Sharif’.


Haitham Saeed kidnapping Gelgm Warfali of pressures Shaal area today.

GOT al-SHALL pressures

Accounting Bureau issued a decision to reduce the salaries of faculty members at the al-Fateh University by 500 dinars and 200 dinars by staff.
How became in 4000 dinars !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ?

TRIPOLI's al-Fateh University Faculty ofMedie

‘Room Zintan operations’:

Freedom for Sheikh Mahmoud al-Zentani Mokhtar, who was abducted by armed militias near a mosque in the capital Tripoli.

Sheikh Mahmoud al-Zentani Mokhtar

Young man beaten to death over a phone that was NOT stolen !

Murder of a strange kind where I will meet the father and his sons two are on the hit younger adult son of the old one ten years because of the theft of phone inside the retreat one of the mosques and the sad thing is that the phone was found later inside the mosque – what was the father and his sons two have only beaten until dead Life boy were arrested the father and his sons.

Beating a traffic policeman at ‘Cimafro al-Karzabih’ and stealing his car.

Tripoli Police destroyed by the Brotherhood ruling Council




In the framework of the provision of humanitarian services, Zintan airport receives shipment of medicines for the benefit of Taiji hospital, set up in shipments of the soles of the mountain and some cities in the western mountain areas.

El Houamed City Heights:
El Houamed City Heights, 1 El Houamed City Heights, 2


Dawn Libya in AZIZIA

al-Azizia _alan ,,,

Hear the sounds of heavy likely lead of clashes.




'CAMP MAJER' outside of ZLITEN, prior bombed by Airforce, now DAASH tookover from 'Roma Libya'


Mass grave found in the Valley of South Madjer of Zliten.





(Friday’s ‘DAASH’ sermon yesterday in Sirte):

Yesterday in Rabat Mosque forward was the sermon of a Sheikh of ‘Yemeni’ nationality, all to rave-up incitement (for their false mistaken conception of ‘jihad’ on the infidel countries such as France, Russia and America and the Libyan National Congress, the Tripoli rat Parliament, and troops of ‘Dawn Libya’; as well as the Libyan Army’s ‘dignity’), describing them as apostates…

and said, quote, “we will make Sirte. Let’s start advertising the ‘Islamic state in Libya’, and will make foreign countries regret on Maflth Muslims in Syria. We will cut their oil revenues in the few coming days, and Onnsah all members of ‘Dawn Libya’ who repentent to us. Also the Hftar ‘criminal forces’ (so they say) and Allah will Nqtalha from their roots. We all wear Jinakm Palmfajkhat and explosive belts.”

At the end of the sermon, the ‘DAASH’ sheikh was said to advise residents of Sirte, that the residents of Sirte city must come with their children to the ‘Islamic lighthouse’

DAASH training kids, 3 DAASH training kids, 2 DAASH training kids DAASH martial arts training w kids

Even Atalmo, meaning being part of the ‘jihad’; and Aokhaddoa, in indoctrinating courses on car bombs and all the martial arts.

DAASH Courses on making bombs

REVEALED: Inside Islamic State’s jihadi training camp where children are trained to kill

ISLAMIC STATE has released shocking footage showing young children being indoctrinated in a jihadi training camp.

By Tom Batchelor

PUBLISHED: 06:00, Wed, 18 Nov 2015 | UPDATED: 07:38, Wed, 18 Nov. 2015

The 19-minute video, seen by, shows children as young four practising martial arts, using Kalashnikov rifles and learning strict Islamic religious law at their DAASH ‘school’.

Entitled ‘Noble Youth’, the professionally shot footage provides a first glimpse of how jihadi fighters’s children are schooled in DAASH / ISIS-held territory.

The camp is specifically for the offspring of foreign militants, meaning many of those are of central Asian or Western descent.

Traditional lessons are shunned in favour of twisted terror lessons.

Children and teenage boys are filmed doing morning exercises on a playing field and playing football with their mentors.

They are then shown eating a breakfast of bread, cheese and vegetables on long dining room tables.

The ISIS training camp near Aleppo

After a lesson in corrupted Sharia law, the Arabic-speaking boys are shown how to clean, load and use Kalashnikov rifles.

Over a haunting soundtrack praising the sons and daughters of DAASH/ISIS, the narrator says: “Allah, by means of these children, opens blind eyes and deaf ears; they carry torches of light and fire with which they burn the agents of the Crusaders, the emissaries of the Jews, and anyone tempted to betray the men of justice and Allah’s oneness.


“Their fire continues to burn until it consumes, in its flames, the Crusader armies at Dabiq [Armageddon].

“They are noble youth, unlike other youth their age, because they have chosen the path trodden by their fathers and the path trodden by the exemplary individuals who preceded their fathers. This is the path of the noble.”

The film, unearthed by jihadi monitoring group Memri, is unverified but carries all the hallmarks of DAASH propaganda, including the ominous black flag.

Breakfast time

IG Breakfast time

AK-47 training

IG AK-47 training.

*The video can be found at:

shown here below, is a ‘DAASH’ recruiting center in Montréal, Canada,

under the guise of supporting the “IRA” !

DAASH recruiting center in Montréal, CANADA


Martin Kobler

The German UNO / NATO client Martn Kobler, sent by the General of the United Nations (as the envoy to Libya), arrived in the city of Tobruk.






There was killed 12 people in Dharv (9 were ‘Lippi’), in just one week during this month in Sabha:

1 – Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed Hamid Lippi, at the age of 26, her age shot to his neck

2 – Mohammed Ahmed Yahya al-Sharif Lippi, at the age of 55 years, Bbtunh a shot from the right side.

3 – Tariq Hamad Ali Abul Qasim Lippi, at the age of 40 years, old was shot in the chest and the neck. He was killed inside his car when trying to steal his car by armed people tried to escape a group of them were shooting by the thieves ..

4 – Mustafa Salem Salem Libby, 14 year old, arrived at the ‘hospital medical Sabha’, deceased infected with a knife stabbed in the neck ..

5 – Safe Libyan Mohammed M’Barek, at the age of 45 years, and arrived at the ‘hospital medical Sabha’, deceased Water hit by a live bullet to the region of the chest.


6 – Ahmed Ismail al-Khbayra Lippi, at the age of 25 years old, lieutenant continued the new police station shot Bbtunh Bjunbh injury left his colleague to work Balkhtae ..

7 – Mohammad Yousuf hate Lippi, at the age of 44 years, had been shot in the chest and abdomen, a Atina inside his car by three armed people trying to steal his car by force of arms, and he is to defend himself and threw them and killed one of them and wounding the other middle and fled third.

8 – Embarek Salem Embarek M’Hamed Lippi, at the age of 18 years, had been shot in the chest and abdomen Atina killed trying to steal a car late ‘Mohammed Yusuf hate’ ..

9. Malik Munir al-Atmi Lippi, at the age of 20 years, suffering from a live bullet to the left shoulder Atina killed trying to hijack Libyan citizen earned, including the exchange of fire and died of his wounds Mtotr ..

10 – Ali Hamad al-Atyosh Lippi, at the age of 25 years, suffered several gunshot wounds in his car ..

11 – Mohammed Awad Hammad, of  Sudanese nationality at the age of 28 years old, shot his neck.
12 – Muhammad Ali Moroccan, of nationality at the age of 30 years, suffering from gunshot wounds and the back thigh al-Emenh Atina killed trying to kidnap someone Libby with him two Libyans got the crossfire and died of his wounds a Mtotr ..




You Can’t Understand ISIS If You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia

originally posted at:

Posted: 27/08/2014 11:56 am EDT Updated: 27/10/2014 5:59 am EDT

WATCH: What Saudi Arabia Has To Do With The Islamic State:

BEIRUT — The dramatic arrival of DAASH (ISIS) on the stage of Iraq has shocked many in the West. Many have been perplexed — and horrified — by its violence and its evident magnetism for Sunni youth.

 Saudi Arabia’s new ruling elite applaud that ISIS is fighting Iranian Shiite “fire” with Sunni “fire”; that a new Sunni state is taking shape at the very heart of what they regard as a historical Sunni patrimony; and they are drawn by DAASH’s strict Wahhabi ideology.

Other Saudis are more fearful, and recall the history of the revolt against Abd-al Aziz by the Wahhabist Ikhwan but which nearly imploded Wahhabism and the al-Saud in the late 1920s.

Many Saudis are deeply disturbed by the radical doctrines of DAASH (ISIS) — and are beginning to question some aspects of Saudi Arabia’s direction and discourse.


Saudi Arabia’s internal discord and tensions over ISIS can only be understood by grasping the inherent (and persisting) duality that lies at the core of the Kingdom’s doctrinal makeup and its historical origins.

One dominant strand to the Saudi identity pertains directly to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (the founder of Wahhabism), and the use to which his radical, exclusionist puritanism was put by Ibn Saud. (The latter was then no more than a minor leader — amongst many — of continually sparring and raiding Bedouin tribes in the baking and desperately poor deserts of the Nejd.)

The second strand to this perplexing duality, relates precisely to King Abd-al Aziz’s subsequent shift towards statehood in the 1920s: his curbing of Ikhwani violence (in order to have diplomatic standing as a nation-state with Britain and America); his institutionalization of the original Wahhabist impulse — and the subsequent seizing of the opportunely surging petrodollar spigot in the 1970s, to channel the volatile Ikhwani current away from home towards export — by diffusing a cultural revolution, rather than violent revolution throughout the Muslim world.

But this “cultural revolution” was no docile reformism. It was a revolution based on Abd al-Wahhab‘s Jacobin-like hatred for the putrescence and deviationism that he perceived all about him — hence his call to purge Islam of all its (so-called by them) ‘heresies and idolatries’.


The American author and journalist, Steven Coll, has written how this austere and censorious disciple of the 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, Abd al-Wahhab, despised “the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca.”

In Abd al-Wahhab’s view, these were not Muslims; they were imposters masquerading as Muslims. Nor, indeed, did he find the behavior of local Bedouin Arabs much better. They aggravated Abd al-Wahhab by their honoring of saints, by their erecting of tombstones, and their “superstition” (e.g. revering graves or places that were deemed particularly imbued with the divine).

All this behavior, Abd al-Wahhab denounced as bida — forbidden by God.

Like Taymiyyah before him, Abd al-Wahhab believed that the period of the Prophet Muhammad’s stay in Medina was the ideal of Muslim society (the “best of times”), to which all Muslims should aspire to emulate (this, essentially, is Wahhabism).

Taymiyyah had declared war on Shi’ism, Sufism and Greek philosophy. He spoke out, too against visiting the grave of the prophet and the celebration of his birthday, declaring that all such behavior represented mere imitation of the Christian worship of Jesus as God (i.e. idolatry). Abd al-Wahhab assimilated all this earlier teaching, stating that “any doubt or hesitation” on the part of a believer in respect to his or her acknowledging this particular interpretation of Islam should “deprive a man of immunity of his property and his life.”

One of the main tenets of Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine has become the key idea of takfir. Under the takfiri doctrine, Abd al-Wahhab and his followers could deem fellow Muslims infidels should they engage in activities that in any way could be said to encroach on the sovereignty of the absolute Authority (that is, the King). Abd al-Wahhab denounced all Muslims who honored the dead, saints, or angels. He held that such sentiments detracted from the complete subservience one must feel towards God, and only God. Wahhabi Islam thus bans any prayer to saints and dead loved ones, pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, religious festivals celebrating saints, the honoring of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, and even prohibits the use of gravestones when burying the dead.

“Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. “

Abd al-Wahhab demanded conformity — a conformity that was to be demonstrated in physical and tangible ways. He argued that all Muslims must individually pledge their allegiance to a single Muslim leader (a Caliph, if there were one). Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. The list of apostates meriting death included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim denominations, whom Abd al-Wahhab did not consider to be Muslim at all.

There is nothing here that separates Wahhabism from ISIS. The rift would emerge only later: from the subsequent institutionalization of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s doctrine of “One Ruler, One Authority, One Mosque” — these three pillars being taken respectively to refer to the Saudi king, the absolute authority of official Wahhabism, and its control of “the word” (i.e. the mosque).

It is this rift — the ISIS denial of these three pillars on which the whole of Sunni authority presently rests — makes ISIS, which in all other respects conforms to Wahhabism, a deep threat to Saudi Arabia.

BRIEF HISTORY 1741- 1818

Abd al-Wahhab’s advocacy of these ultra radical views inevitably led to his expulsion from his own town — and in 1741, after some wanderings, he found refuge under the protection of Ibn Saud and his tribe. What Ibn Saud perceived in Abd al-Wahhab’s novel teaching was the means to overturn Arab tradition and convention. It was a path to seizing power.

“Their strategy — like that of ISIS today — was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear. “

Ibn Saud’s clan, seizing on Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, now could do what they always did, which was raiding neighboring villages and robbing them of their possessions. Only now they were doing it not within the ambit of Arab tradition, but rather under the banner of jihad. Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab also reintroduced the idea of martyrdom in the name of jihad, as it granted those martyred immediate entry into paradise.

In the beginning, they conquered a few local communities and imposed their rule over them. (The conquered inhabitants were given a limited choice: conversion to Wahhabism or death.) By 1790, the Alliance controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula and repeatedly raided Medina, Syria and Iraq.

Their strategy — like that of ISIS today — was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear. In 1801, the Allies attacked the Holy City of Karbala in Iraq. They massacred thousands of Shiites, including women and children. Many Shiite shrines were destroyed, including the shrine of Imam Hussein, the murdered grandson of Prophet Muhammad.

A British official, Lieutenant Francis Warden, observing the situation at the time, wrote: “They pillaged the whole of it [Karbala], and plundered the Tomb of Hussein… slaying in the course of the day, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants …”

Osman Ibn Bishr Najdi, the historian of the first Saudi state, wrote that Ibn Saud committed a massacre in Karbala in 1801. He proudly documented that massacre saying, “we took Karbala and slaughtered and took its people (as slaves), then praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and we do not apologize for that and say: ‘And to the unbelievers: the same treatment.'”

In 1803, Abdul Aziz then entered the Holy City of Mecca, which surrendered under the impact of terror and panic (the same fate was to befall Medina, too). Abd al-Wahhab’s followers demolished historical monuments and all the tombs and shrines in their midst. By the end, they had destroyed centuries of Islamic architecture near the Grand Mosque.

But in November of 1803, a Shiite assassin killed King Abdul Aziz (taking revenge for the massacre at Karbala). His son, Saud bin Abd al Aziz, succeeded him and continued the conquest of Arabia. Ottoman rulers, however, could no longer just sit back and watch as their empire was devoured piece by piece. In 1812, the Ottoman army, composed of Egyptians, pushed the Alliance out from Medina, Jeddah and Mecca. In 1814, Saud bin Abd al Aziz died of fever. His unfortunate son Abdullah bin Saud, however, was taken by the Ottomans to Istanbul, where he was gruesomely executed (a visitor to Istanbul reported seeing him having been humiliated in the streets of Istanbul for three days, then hanged and beheaded, his severed head fired from a canon, and his heart cut out and impaled on his body).

In 1815, Wahhabi forces were crushed by the Egyptians (acting on the Ottoman’s behalf) in a decisive battle. In 1818, the Ottomans captured and destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Dariyah. The first Saudi state was no more. The few remaining Wahhabis withdrew into the desert to regroup, and there they remained, quiescent for most of the 19th century.


It is not hard to understand how the founding of the Islamic State by ISIS in contemporary Iraq might resonate amongst those who recall this history. Indeed, the ethos of 18th century Wahhabism did not just wither in Nejd, but it roared back into life when the Ottoman Empire collapsed amongst the chaos of World War I.

The al Saud — in this 20th century renaissance — were led by the laconic and politically astute Abd-al Aziz, who, on uniting the fractious Bedouin tribes, launched the Saudi “Ikhwan” in the spirit of Abd-al Wahhab’s and Ibn Saud’s earlier fighting proselytisers.

The Ikhwan was a reincarnation of the early, fierce, semi-independent vanguard movement of committed armed Wahhabist “moralists” who almost had succeeded in seizing Arabia by the early 1800s. In the same manner as earlier, the Ikhwan again succeeded in capturing Mecca, Medina and Jeddah between 1914 and 1926. Abd-al Aziz, however, began to feel his wider interests to be threatened by the revolutionary “Jacobinism” exhibited by the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan revolted — leading to a civil war that lasted until the 1930s, when the King had them put down: he machine-gunned them.

For this king, (Abd-al Aziz), the simple verities of previous decades were eroding. Oil was being discovered in the peninsular. Britain and America were courting Abd-al Aziz, but still were inclined to support Sharif Husain as the only legitimate ruler of Arabia. The Saudis needed to develop a more sophisticated diplomatic posture.

So Wahhabism was forcefully changed from a movement of revolutionary jihad and theological takfiri purification, to a movement of conservative social, political, theological, and religious da’wa (Islamic call) and to justifying the institution that upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and the King’s absolute power.


With the advent of the oil bonanza — as the French scholar, Giles Kepel writes, Saudi goals were to “reach out and spread Wahhabism across the Muslim world … to “Wahhabise” Islam, thereby reducing the “multitude of voices within the religion” to a “single creed” — a movement which would transcend national divisions. Billions of dollars were — and continue to be — invested in this manifestation of soft power.

It was this heady mix of billion dollar soft power projection — and the Saudi willingness to manage Sunni Islam both to further America’s interests, as it concomitantly embedded Wahhabism educationally, socially and culturally throughout the lands of Islam — that brought into being a western policy dependency on Saudi Arabia, a dependency that has endured since Abd-al Aziz’s meeting with Roosevelt on a U.S. warship (returning the president from the Yalta Conference) until today.

Westerners looked at the Kingdom and their gaze was taken by the wealth; by the apparent modernization; by the professed leadership of the Islamic world. They chose to presume that the Kingdom was bending to the imperatives of modern life — and that the management of Sunni Islam would bend the Kingdom, too, to modern life.

“On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist. On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahhabism.”

But the Saudi Ikhwan approach to Islam did not die in the 1930s. It retreated, but it maintained its hold over parts of the system — hence the duality that we observe today in the Saudi attitude towards ISIS.

On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist. On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahhabism.

ISIS is a “post-Medina” movement: it looks to the actions of the first two Caliphs, rather than the Prophet Muhammad himself, as a source of emulation, and it forcefully denies the Saudis’ claim of authority to rule.

As the Saudi monarchy blossomed in the oil age into an ever more inflated institution, the appeal of the Ikhwan message gained ground (despite King Faisal’s modernization campaign). The “Ikhwan approach” enjoyed — and still enjoys — the support of many prominent men and women and sheikhs. In a sense, Osama bin Laden was precisely the representative of a late flowering of this Ikhwani approach.

Saudi’s new King Salman, a strict WAHABBIST, shows a return to the true origins of the Saudi-Wahhab project.

Saudi Arabia's King Salman

In the collaborative management of the region by the Saudis and the West in pursuit of the many western projects (countering socialism, Ba’athism, Nasserism, Soviet and Iranian influence), western politicians have highlighted their chosen reading of Saudi Arabia (wealth, modernization and influence), but they chose to ignore the Wahhabist impulse.

After all, the more radical Islamist movements were perceived by Western intelligence services as being more effective in toppling the USSR in Afghanistan — and in combatting out-of-favor Middle Eastern leaders and states.

Why should we be surprised then, that from Prince Bandar’s Saudi-Western mandate to manage the insurgency in Syria against President Assad should have emerged a neo-Ikhwan type of violent, fear-inducing vanguard movement: ISIS? And why should we be surprised — knowing a little about Wahhabism — that “moderate” insurgents in Syria would become rarer than a mythical unicorn? Why should we have imagined that radical Wahhabism would create moderates? Or why could we imagine that a doctrine of “One leader, One authority, One mosque: submit to it, or be killed” could ever ultimately lead to moderation or tolerance?

Or, perhaps, we never imagined.

 Please disregard the original of PART II…as it is now all wrong:


BEIRUT — ISIS is indeed a veritable time bomb inserted into the heart of the Middle East. But its destructive power is not as commonly understood. It is not with the “March of the Beheaders”; it is not with the killings; the seizure of towns and villages; the harshest of “justice” — terrible though they are — that its true explosive power lies. It is yet more potent than its exponential pull on young Muslims, its huge arsenal of weapons and its hundreds of millions of dollars.

“We should understand that there is really almost nothing that the West can now do about it but sit and watch.”

Its real potential for destruction lies elsewhere — in the implosion of Saudi Arabia as a foundation stone of the modern Middle East. We should understand that there is really almost nothing that the West can now do about it but sit and watch.

The clue to its truly explosive potential, as Saudi scholar Fouad Ibrahim has pointed out (but which has passed, almost wholly overlooked, or its significance has gone unnoticed), is ISIS’ deliberate and intentional use in its doctrine — of the language of Abd-al Wahhab, the 18th century founder, together with Ibn Saud, of Wahhabism and the Saudi project:

Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the first “prince of the faithful” in the Islamic State of Iraq, in 2006 formulated, for instance, the principles of his prospective state … Among its goals is disseminating monotheism “which is the purpose [for which humans were created] and [for which purpose they must be called] to Islam…” This language replicates exactly Abd-al Wahhab’s formulation. And, not surprisingly, the latter’s writings and Wahhabi commentaries on his works are widely distributed in the areas under ISIS’ control and are made the subject of study sessions. Baghdadi subsequently was to note approvingly, “a generation of young men [have been] trained based on the forgotten doctrine of loyalty and disavowal.”

And what is this “forgotten” tradition of “loyalty and disavowal?” It is Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine that belief in a sole (for him an anthropomorphic) God — who was alone worthy of worship — was in itself insufficient to render man or woman a Muslim?

He or she could be no true believer, unless additionally, he or she actively denied (and destroyed) any other subject of worship. The list of such potential subjects of idolatrous worship, which al-Wahhab condemned as idolatry, was so extensive that almost all Muslims were at risk of falling under his definition of “unbelievers.” They therefore faced a choice: Either they convert to al-Wahhab’s vision of Islam — or be killed, and their wives, their children and physical property taken as the spoils of jihad. Even to express doubts about this doctrine, al-Wahhab said, should occasion execution.


The point Fuad Ibrahim is making, I believe, is not merely to re-emphasize the extreme reductionism of al-Wahhab’s vision, but to hint at something entirely different: That ‘through its intentional adoption of this Wahhabist language, ISIS is knowingly lighting the fuse to a bigger regional explosion….’

For it was precisely this idealistic, puritan, proselytizing formulation by al-Wahhab that was “father” to the entire Saudi “project” (one that was violently suppressed by the Ottomans in 1818, but spectacularly resurrected in the 1920s, to become the Saudi Kingdom that we know today). But since its renaissance in the 1920s, the Saudi project has always carried within it, the “gene” of its own self-destruction.


Paradoxically, it was a maverick British official, who helped embed the gene into the new state. The British official attached to Aziz, was one Harry St. John Philby (the father of the MI6 officer who spied for the Soviet KGB, Kim Philby). He was to become King Abd al-Aziz’s close adviser, having resigned as a British official, and was until his death, a key member of the Ruler’s Court. He, like Lawrence of Arabia, was an Arabist. He was also a convert to Wahhabi Islam and known as Sheikh Abdullah.

St. John Philby was a man on the make: he had determined to make his friend, Abd al-Aziz, the ruler of Arabia. Indeed, it is clear that in furthering this ambition he was not acting on official instructions. When, for example, he encouraged King Aziz to expand in northern Nejd, he was ordered to desist. But (as American author, Stephen Schwartz notes), Aziz was well aware that Britain had pledged repeatedly that the defeat of the Ottomans would produce an Arab state, and this no doubt, encouraged Philby and Aziz to aspire to the latter becoming its new ruler.

It is not clear exactly what passed between Philby and the Ruler (the details seem somehow to have been suppressed), but it would appear that Philby’s vision was not confined to state-building in the conventional way, but rather was one of transforming the wider Islamic ummah (or community of believers) into a Wahhabist instrument that would entrench the al-Saud as Arabia’s leaders. And for this to happen, Aziz needed to win British acquiescence (and much later, American endorsement). “This was the gambit that Abd al-Aziz made his own, with advice from Philby,” notes Schwartz.


In a sense, Philby may be said to be “godfather” to this momentous pact by which the Saudi leadership would use its clout to “manage” Sunni Islam on behalf of western objectives (containing socialism, Ba’athism, Nasserism, Soviet influence, Iran, etc.) — and in return, the West would acquiesce to Saudi Arabia’s soft-power Wahhabisation of the Islamic ummah (with its concomitant destruction of Islam’s intellectual traditions and diversity and its sowing of deep divisions within the Muslim world).

“In political and financial terms, the Saud-Philby strategy has been an astonishing success. But it was always rooted in British and American intellectual obtuseness: the refusal to see the dangerous ‘gene’ within the Wahhabist project, its latent potential to mutate, at any time, back into its original bloody strain. In any event, this has just happened: ISIS is it.

As a result — from then until now — British and American policy has been bound to Saudi aims (as tightly as to their own ones), and has been heavily dependent on Saudi Arabia for direction in pursuing its course in the Middle East.

Winning western endorsement (and continued western endorsement), however, required a change of mode: the “project” had to change from being an armed, proselytizing Islamic vanguard movement into something resembling statecraft. This was never going to be easy because of the inherent contradictions involved (‘so-called by them as a ‘puritan’ morality versus realpolitik and money)…

Even Abd al-Aziz himself faced an allergic reaction: in the form of a serious rebellion from his own Wahhabi militia, the Saudi Ikhwan. When the expansion of control by the Ikhwan reached the border of territories controlled by Britain, Abd al-Aziz tried to restrain his militia (Philby was urging him to seek British patronage), but the Ikwhan, already critical of his use of modern technology (the telephone, telegraph and the machine gun), “were outraged by the abandonment of jihad for reasons of worldly realpolitik … They refused to lay down their weapons; and instead rebelled against their king … After a series of bloody clashes, they were crushed in 1929. Ikhwan members who had remained loyal, were later absorbed into the [Saudi] National Guard.”

King Aziz’s son and heir, Saud, faced a different form of reaction (less bloody, but more effective). Aziz’s son was deposed from the throne by the religious establishment — in favor of his brother Faisal — because of his ostentatious and extravagant conduct. His lavish, ostentatious style, offended the religious establishment who expected the “Imam of Muslims,” to pursue a pious, proselytizing lifestyle.

King Faisal, Saud’s successor, in his turn, was shot by his nephew in 1975, who had appeared at Court ostensibly to make his oath of allegiance, but who instead, pulled out a pistol and shot the king in his head. The nephew had been perturbed by the encroachment of western beliefs and innovation into Wahhabi society, to the detriment of the original ideals of the Wahhabist project.


Far more serious, however, was the revived Ikhwan of Juhayman al-Otaybi, which culminated in the seizure of the Grand Mosque by some 400-500 armed men and women in 1979. Juhayman was from the influential Otaybi tribe from the Nejd, which had led and been a principal element in the original Ikhwan of the 1920s.

Juhayman and his followers, many of whom came from the Medina seminary, had the tacit support, amongst other clerics, of Sheikh Abdel-Aziz Bin Baz, the former Mufti of Saudi Arabia. Juhayman stated that Sheikh Bin Baz never objected to his Ikhwan teachings (which were also critical of ulema laxity towards “disbelief”), but that bin Baz had blamed him mostly for harking on that “the ruling al-Saud dynasty had lost its legitimacy because it was corrupt, ostentatious and had destroyed Saudi culture by an aggressive policy of westernisation.”

Significantly, Juhayman’s followers preached their Ikhwani message in a number of mosques in Saudi Arabia initially without being arrested, but when Juhayman and a number of the Ikhwan finally were held for questioning in 1978. Members of the ulema (including bin Baz) cross-examined them for heresy, but then ordered their release because they saw them as being no more than traditionalists harkening back to the Ikhwan— like Juhayman grandfather — and therefore not a threat.

Even when the mosque seizure was defeated and over, a certain level of forbearance by the ulema for the rebels remained. When the government asked for a fatwa allowing for armed force to be used in the mosque, the language of bin Baz and other senior ulema was curiously restrained. The scholars did not declare Juhayman and his followers non-Muslims, despite their violation of the sanctity of the Grand Mosque, but only termed them al-jamaah al-musallahah (the armed group).

The group that Juhayman led was far from marginalized from important sources of power and wealth. In a sense, it swam in friendly, receptive waters. Juhayman’s grandfather had been one of the leaders of the the original Ikhwan, and after the rebellion against Abdel Aziz, many of his grandfather’s comrades in arms were absorbed into the National Guard — indeed Juhayman himself had served within the Guard — thus Juhayman was able to obtain weapons and military expertise from sympathizers in the National Guard, and the necessary arms and food to sustain the siege were pre-positioned, and hidden, within the Grand Mosque. Juhayman was also able to call on wealthy individuals to fund the enterprise.

ISIS however, is a neo-Ikhwani rejectionist protest that is taking place outside the kingdom — and which, moreover, follows the Juhayman dissidence in its trenchant criticism of the al-Saud ruling family.

The new king Salman is a strict Wahhabist of the “Juhayman” orientation of which bin Laden, and the Saudi supporters of ISIS and the Saudi religious establishment are a part. 

According to the Saudi-owned Al-Hayat newspaper, in July 2014 “an opinion poll of Saudis [was] released on social networking sites, claiming that 92 percent of the target group believes that ‘IS conforms to the values of Islam and Islamic law.'” The leading Saudi commentator, Jamal Khashoggi, recently warned of ISIS’ Saudi supporters who “watch from the shadows.”

There are angry youths with a skewed mentality and understanding of life and sharia, and they are canceling a heritage of centuries and the supposed gains of a modernization that hasn’t been completed. They turned into rebels, emirs and a caliph invading a vast area of our land. They are hijacking our children’s minds and canceling borders. They reject all rules and legislations, throwing it [a]way … for their vision of politics, governance, life, society and economy. [For] the citizens of the self-declared “commander of the faithful,” or Caliph, you have no other choice … They don’t care if you stand out among your people and if you are an educated man, or a lecturer, or a tribe leader, or a religious leader, or an active politician or even a judge … You must obey the commander of the faithful and pledge the oath of allegiance to him. When their policies are questioned, Abu Obedia al-Jazrawi yells, saying: “Shut up. Our reference is the book and the Sunna and that’s it.”

 (MU’AMMAR al-Qathafi rejected the SUNNAH and Hadath and any other writing and books of the Ulami, other than the HOLY QUR’AN as Sharia LAW.)

“What did we do wrong?” Khashoggi asks. With 3,000-4,000 Saudi fighters in the Islamic State today, he advises of the need to “look inward to explain ISIS’ rise”. Maybe it is time, he says, to admit “our political mistakes,” to “correct the mistakes of our predecessors.”

The new King, Salman, is a strict Wahhabist who has objected to all other schools of jurisprudence other than his own.

“The key political question is whether the simple fact of ISIS’ successes, and the full manifestation (flowering) of all the original pieties and vanguardism of the archetypal impulse, will stimulate and activate the dissenter ‘gene’ — within the Saudi kingdom.”  Saudi Arabia is now engulfed by the ISIS fervor, and is part of the reason for going after Yemen.

al-Wahhab held a particular animosity towards the Shiite and held them to be apostates. As recently as the 1990s, clerics such as bin Baz — the former Mufti — and Abdullah Jibrin reiterated the customary view that the Shiite were infidels.

 ISIS, for example, regards any who seek jurisdiction other than that offered by the Islamic State itself to be guilty of disbelief — since all such “other” jurisdictions embody innovation or “borrowings” from other cultures in its view.

The key political question is whether the simple fact of ISIS’ successes, and the full manifestation (flowering) of all the original pieties and vanguardism of the archetypal impulse, will stimulate and activate the dissenter ‘gene’ — within the Saudi kingdom.

Saudi Arabia is now engulfed by the ISIS fervor.

In short, this is the nature of the time bomb tossed into the Middle East. The ISIS allusions to Abd al-Wahhab and Juhayman (whose dissident writings are circulated within ISIS) present a powerful provocation.

This is the ISIS “bomb” hurled into Saudi society.

The Saudi Ikhwani history is plain: As Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab made it such in the 18th century; and as the Saudi Ikhwan made it such in the 20th century. Things have changed in Saudi Artabia for the worse…The ‘new’ King Salman, is a strict Wahhabist, and is working with the Islamic State, and supports ISIS in Yemen; and is supplying DAASH/ ISLAMIC STATE in all parts of the world. ISIS is the new Emirs of Arabia, and desires to rule the entire world..

OBAMA leads the brotherhood



2 month old baby with hair

Turkey to prevent a Libyan baby two months old from entering their territory under the pretext of not having a visa and is accompanied by his mother, who was granted a visa !



Egypt Qallkm what Oderoa state Come spoken to me.




Prevent the entry of ‘Libyan-rats learned’ to ‘Santiago Barnbio Stadium’: Such are to be considered a ‘terrorist state flag’.

Ziedkm him O riffraff …. !!!!!





Three students outside the Science College of Benghazi University. They say they expect to have opportunities in Libya that would not have been possible when Moammar Gadhafi was in power.

‘Basic People’s Congress Elvis Bucky free’, reports
The ambassador, “Ahmed Safar expulsion of Libyan students from the Libyan school in the capital Rome .. The reasons for expulsion were political; because, of the different political affiliations to parents and Ambassador isolated.



Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s